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Targeting versus Instrument Rules 
for Monetary Policy:
What Is Wrong with McCallum and Nelson?
Lars E.O. Svensson
In their struggle against targeting rules, how-
ever, McCallum and Nelson seem to face an uphill
battle. There is now a rapidly growing literature by
many authors that successfully applies targeting
rules to monetary policy analysis. This literature
includes recent contributions by Benigno and
Benigno (2003), Benigno and Woodford (2004a,b),
Cecchetti (1998, 2000), Cecchetti and Kim (2004),
Evans and Honkapohja (2004), Giannoni and
Woodford (2003a,b and 2004), Kuttner (2004),
Mishkin (2002), Onatski and Williams (2004),
Preston (2004), Walsh (2003 and 2004a,b),
Woodford (2004), and others. In the first drafts of
Woodford’s (2003) book, there were no targeting
rules; in the final, published version, targeting
rules are prominent. In 1998, at a distinguished
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1 INTRODUCTION
M
y good friends Ben McCallum and
Ed Nelson have written a paper,
McCallum and Nelson (2005), with
arguably a somewhat destructive purpose. They
attempt to contradict the arguments in favor of
targeting rules, rather than instrument rules, in
positive and normative analysis of monetary
policy that I have presented in Svensson (2003b)
and previous papers (for instance, Svensson, 1997
and 1999). In their concluding section, they sug-
gest that Svensson (2003b) “does not develop any
compelling reasons for preferring targeting rules
over instrument rules.” They seem to believe that
the concept of targeting rules is unnecessary and
that instrument rules are all that is needed in
monetary policy analysis.
In their paper “Targeting versus Instrument Rules for Monetary Policy,” McCallum and Nelson
critique targeting rules for the analysis of monetary policy. Their arguments are rebutted here.
First, McCallum and Nelson’s preference to study the robustness of simple monetary policy rules
is no reason at all to limit attention to simple instrument rules; simple targeting rules may have
more desirable properties. Second, optimal targeting rules are a compact, robust, and structural
description of goal-directed monetary policy, analogous to the compact, robust, and structural con-
sumption Euler conditions in the theory of consumption. They express the very robust condition
of equality of the marginal rates of substitution and transformation between the central bank’s target
variables. Indeed, they provide desirable micro foundations of monetary policy. Third, under
realistic information assumptions, the instrument rule analog to any targeting rule that McCallum
and Nelson have proposed results in very large instrument rate volatility and is also, for other
reasons, inferior to a targeting rule.
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            conference on monetary policy rules (Taylor,
1999), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) was the
only paper to use targeting rules; in 2003, at an
equally distinguished NBER conference on infla-
tion targeting (Bernanke and Woodford, 2004),
several papers used targeting rules and no paper
used a simple instrument rule as a model of infla-
tion targeting. A Google search with the string
‘“targeting rules” AND monetary’ gave about 1,700
results in April 2004, about 2,100 in August 2004,
and about 5,700 in June 2005. There are, hence,
more papers than mine—indeed, some books—
that McCallum and Nelson may want to take
issue with.1
To be clear: An instrument rule is a formula
for setting the central bank’s instrument rate as a
given function of observable variables. A simple
instrument rule makes the instrument rate a simple
function of a few observable variables. The best-
known example of a simple instrument rule is
the Taylor rule, where the instrument rate is a
linear function of the inflation gap (between infla-
tion and an inflation target) and the output gap
(between output and potential output). Another
example is a formula for adjusting the monetary
base proposed by McCallum (1988) and Meltzer
(1987).2
A (specific) targeting rule specifies a condition
to be fulfilled by the central bank’s target variables
(or forecasts thereof). A real-world example of a
simple targeting rule is the one that has been
applied by the Bank of England, Sweden’s
Riksbank, and the Bank of Norway (Goodhart,
2001; Svensson, 2003a; Svensson et al., 2002):
The two-year-ahead inflation forecast shall equal
the inflation target. More precisely, the instrument
rate shall be set such that the two-year-ahead
inflation forecast equals the inflation target.3 An
optimal targeting rule is a first-order condition
for optimal monetary policy. But, importantly,
not all targeting rules are optimal targeting rules.4
McCallum and Nelson explain that “we are
more attracted to analysis with instrument rules
than with targeting rules” (p. 598). They imply
that the main reason is that “an attractive approach
to policy design...is to search for an instrument
rule that performs at least moderately well—
avoiding disasters—in a variety of plausible
models” (p. 599). Thus, McCallum and Nelson
are attracted to simple and robust instrument
rules; they agree with Svensson (2003b) that a
complex optimal instrument rule is not practical.
The idea of a robust and simple instrument rule
is further developed in McCallum (1988 and 1999).
A simple and robust monetary policy rule is
indeed an attractive idea. There is always some
uncertainty about the true model of the transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy, and monetary
policy is always conducted under considerable
uncertainty of different kinds. A simple and robust
monetary policy rule gives the central bank an
option that it can fall back on in difficult times.
A central bank that knows nothing except current
inflation and some estimate of the current output
gap can always fall back on a Taylor rule. If the
bank does not trust its information about inflation
and the output gap, but data on monetary aggre-
gates are more easily accessible or more reliable,
the central bank can fall back further on Friedman’s
rule of k-percent money growth.
But several facts stand in the way of McCallum
and Nelson’s attraction to simple instrument rules.
First, the fact is that nothing says that a simple
and robust monetary policy rule must be an
instrument rule. For instance, Friedman’s k-percent
rule is a targeting rule! The k percent refers to a
broad monetary aggregate, such as M2 or M3.
Svensson
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1 Sims (1980) and Aizenman and Frenkel (1986) provide early dis-
cussions of targeting rules (the former without using the term).
2 Svensson (2005) provides a compact and general definition of
targeting rules and instrument rules. An explicit instrument rule
is an instrument rule where the instrument is a function of prede-
termined variables only. An implicit instrument rule is an instru-
ment rule where the instrument is related to a non-predetermined
variable. An implicit instrument rule is an equilibrium condition,
where several variables are simultaneously determined. This makes
the practical implementation of implicit instrument rules more
complicated than that of explicit instrument rules (see footnote 12).
Any given equilibrium is consistent with a continuum of implicit
instrument rules.
3 Strangely, McCallum and Nelson seem to believe that no central
bank is using a targeting rule and that a central bank needs to
announce an explicit loss function to use a targeting rule. Obviously,
neither of these beliefs is correct, as this paragraph shows.
4 Although McCallum and Nelson seem to want to restrict the dis-
cussion of targeting rules to optimal targeting rules, that makes no
more sense than to restrict the discussion of instrument rules to
optimal instrument rules.This is an (intermediate) target variable, not an
instrument. It reacts with a lag of a quarter or so
to changes in the central bank’s instrument (the
instrument rate or the monetary base). The way
to implement Friedman’s k-percent rule, then, is
to make forecasts of broad money growth for the
next quarter and set the instrument such that the
one-quarter-ahead money-growth forecast equals
k percent (Svensson, 1999). Thus, the targeting
rule: “Set the instrument such that the forecast
of money growth equals k percent.”5 The simple
monetary policy rule used by the Bank of England,
the Riksbank, and the Bank of Norway—already
mentioned above—is also a targeting rule. Walsh
(2004b) has recently demonstrated an equivalence
between the robust-control policies of Hansen
and Sargent (2003 and 2005) and the optimal tar-
geting rules derived by Giannoni and Woodford
(2003a,b).6
Second, the fact is that central banks normally
do not use the fallback options of the simple
instrument rules of Taylor or McCallum and
Meltzer or even the simple targeting rule of
Friedman’s k percent. With improved understand-
ing of the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy, increased experience, and better-designed
objectives for monetary policy, central banks
believe that they can do better than follow these
mechanical simple rules. They have developed
complex decision processes, where huge amounts
of data are collected, processed, and analyzed
(see Brash, 2001, and Svensson, 2001). They con-
struct forecasts of their target variables, typically
inflation and the output gap, conditional on their
view of the transmission mechanism, their esti-
mate of the current state of the economy and the
development of a number of exogenous economic
variables, and alternative instrument rate paths.
They select and implement an instrument rate or
an instrument rate path such that the correspon-
ding forecasts of the targeting variables “look good”
relative to the objectives of the central bank. I have
called this monetary policy process “forecast tar-
geting.” It is a decision process and implementa-
tion of monetary policy that is very different from
the mechanical application of the simple instru-
ment rules that McCallum and Nelson favor.
Advanced central banks attempt to do better, to
fulfill their objectives as well as possible, to opti-
mize. I am advocating targeting rules as a better
way to describe and prescribe this kind of mone-
tary policy than the simple instrument rules. Tar-
geting rules are one way to make the “look good”
concept precise. Bernanke (2004) endorses this
view of practical monetary policy, although he
uses the term “forecast-based policies” rather than
“forecast targeting.”7
Third, since central banks in a number of
countries have developed this approach of fore-
cast targeting to monetary policy (essentially the
implementation of inflation targeting that started
in a few countries in the early 1990s and has since
spread to a large number of countries), the mon-
Svensson
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5 A broad monetary aggregate such as M2 or M3 is to a large extent
endogenously determined by demand and supply of broad money
and an endogenous multiplier between broad money and the mone-
tary base. It reacts with a lag of a quarter or so to central bank adjust-
ments of the instrument rate or the monetary base and is subject
to various intervening shocks during that lag. Hence, the central
bank does not have complete control over broad money; therefore,
it is not an instrument of monetary policy. Even if the money growth
forecast is on target, actual money growth will ex post deviate from
k percent due to unanticipated shocks and imperfections in the
forecasts.
6 In some of the literature mentioned above, the instrument rate is
also a target variable (that is, an argument of the loss function). In
such cases, the instrument rate appears in the targeting rule, and
the targeting rule is also an implicit instrument rule. Some of the
literature, for instance, Walsh (2004b), follows Giannoni and
Woodford (2003a,b) and frequently refers to such targeting rules
as instrument rules, which is a source of some confusion. A good
test of whether a rule is fundamentally a targeting rule or an instru-
ment rule is to let the weight on the instrument rate in the loss
function go to zero. If the instrument rate then vanishes from the
rule, it is better to call it a targeting rule.
7 McCallum and Nelson note (in Section 4) that many central bank
publications refer to simple instrument rules. But this merely
demonstrates how the concept of simple instrument rules has
previously dominated the monetary policy debate (for instance,
as noted, in Taylor, 1999). It does not imply that central banks
conduct monetary policy by implementing simple instrument rules.
They also note that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) has
used a particular instrument rule in generating forecasts in the so-
called Forecasting and Policy System (Black et al., 1997). But, as far
as I know, the instrument path generated by the instrument rule is
subject to considerable judgmental adjustment, especially for the
first few quarters. Furthermore, the instrument rate path and the
inflation and output gap forecasts generated can be seen as reference
paths and forecasts, used as an input in the policy decision, in the
same way other central banks use forecasts conditional on a constant
interest rate. They are not necessarily the central bank’s optimal
instrument rate plan and optimal inflation and output gap forecasts
(although I am advocating improvements in that direction; see
Svensson, 2001, 2003a). Thus, the RBNZ’s use of an instrument rule
in generating its forecasts does not imply that the RBNZ is actually
following that instrument rule in setting its instrument rate.etary policy outcome in those countries has been
extremely good. The past decade has seen unprece-
dented monetary and real stability with low infla-
tion in a number of countries. This makes it even
more important, I believe, to develop the tools and
definitions through which this kind of monetary
policy can be best understood.8
McCallum and Nelson have one somewhat
constructive contribution in their paper. They
provide further analysis of the proposition, pre-
viously put forward in McCallum (1999, p. 1493)
and McCallum and Nelson (2000), that there is a
useful instrument rule analog, with a very large
response coefficient, to any targeting rule. In par-
ticular, they maintain that this large response
coefficient, counter to what is argued in Svensson
and Woodford (2005), Svensson (2003b), and, in
a related case, in Bernanke and Woodford (1997),
does not imply higher volatility of the instrument
rate, even if the central bank makes some realistic
errors in determining the arguments for the instru-
ment rule. However, as we shall see, under reason-
able information assumptions, McCallum and
Nelson are wrong. A large response coefficient
does indeed make the instrument rate very volatile.
Only under very strange information assumptions
is there no extra volatility. Even if they were right
on this volatility issue, there still seems to be no
point to their proposed instrument rule analog.
As we shall see, it simply adds unnecessary com-
plexity to the monetary policy rule for no apparent
gain. It is conceptually and numerically inferior
to the targeting rule, and it is not neutral from a
determinacy point of view. In summary, the idea
of instrument rules with very large response
coefficients is both impractical and pointless.
Section 2 shows a useful analogy between the
development of Euler conditions as structural
descriptions of consumption choice in the theory
of consumption and the development of targeting
rules as a structural description of monetary policy
in the theory of monetary policy. Section 3 gives
an example of an optimal targeting rule and dis-
cusses some of its properties, including its robust-
ness. Section 4 shows that the instrument rule
analog proposed by McCallum and Nelson indeed
brings high instrument rate volatility under rea-
sonable information assumptions. Section 5 dis-
cusses McCallum and Nelson’s criticism of my
definition of “general” targeting rules. I concede
that another term, Walsh’s (2003) “targeting
regimes,” may be preferable. Consequently, in
future work, I am inclined to use the term “target-
ing regime” rather than “general targeting rule”
and to let “targeting rules,” as in this introduction,
refer to what I have also called “specific” targeting
rules.
2 AN ANALOGY WITH 
CONSUMPTION THEORY
To view the issue of targeting rules versus
instrument rules from a broader descriptive per-
spective, it is useful to compare this issue with
the modeling of consumption in macroeconomics.
Several decades ago, it was common to model
consumption in period t, Ct, as a given function
of income, Yt, the real rate of interest, Rt, and
possibly other variables,
(1)
In the past 25 years, especially after Hall
(1978), it has become common to model consump-
tion as fulfilling an Euler condition—a first-order
condition for optimal consumption choice, which,
for an additively separable utility function of a
representative consumer, has the simple form,
(2)
Here, the left side of (2) is the representative
consumer’s expected marginal rate of substitution












Cf R Y tt t = () ,, … .
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8 McCallum and Nelson disagree with my statement that one of the
problems with a commitment to an instrument rule as a description
and prescription of monetary policy “is that a commitment to an
instrument rule does not leave any room for judgmental adjustments
and extra-model information” (Svensson, 2003b, p. 442). They state
(on p. 600): “This claim is difficult for us to understand, since there
seem to be various ways in which judgmental adjustments to instru-
ment rule prescriptions could be made. For example, the interest
rate instrument could be set above (or below) the rule-indicated
value when policymaker judgments indicate that conditions, not
adequately reflected in the central bank’s formal quantitative
models, imply different forecasts and consequently call for addi-
tional policy tightening (or loosening).” McCallum and Nelson
seem to believe that a commitment is consistent with discretionary
adjustments, an obvious contradiction.tion (0 < δ < 1 is a discount factor and UC(Ct)
denotes the marginal utility of consumption).
The right side is the consumer’s marginal rate of
transformation of period-t +1 consumption into
period-t consumption, when the consumer can
borrow or lend; that is, the period-t consumption
value of consumption in period t +1. A loglinear
approximation to (2) is
(3)
where ct ; lnCt, ct+1|t ; Etct+1, σ is the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution, rt ; ln(1 + Rt) is
the continuously compounded real interest rate,
and ρ ; –lnδ > 0 is the rate of time preference.
As is well known, a serious problem with
modeling consumption as a given consumption
function is that this function is not a structural
relation but a reduced form. Its properties and
parameters depend on the whole model of the
economy, including the existing shocks and their
stochastic properties, the monetary and fiscal
policy pursued, and so forth.
In contrast, the consumption Euler condition
(2) or (3) is more structural, independent of the rest
of the model, and independent of the monetary
and fiscal policy pursued. It is a robust, compact,
and therefore practical description of optimizing
consumption behavior. Indeed, this development
of a more microfounded modeling of consumption
is an integral part of the rational expectations
revolution in macroeconomics.
The consumption function can be seen as
an instrument rule for consumption behavior,
whereas the Euler condition (2) or (3) can be seen
as a targeting rule for consumption. When I argue
for the adoption of targeting rules rather than
instrument rules in modeling monetary policy, I
am arguing for a development in the theory of
monetary policy that already happened, a long
time ago, in the theory of consumption.
McCallum and Nelson are attracted to model-
ing monetary policy with instrument rules rather
than targeting rules also for descriptive purposes
(see Section 4). If they were consistent, they
should also prefer to model consumption with
consumption functions rather than Euler condi-
tions. But they are not consistent. Indeed, it is a
cc r t tt t =− − () +1 σρ ,
great irony that one of McCallum and Nelson’s
important contributions to macroeconomics is
precisely the introduction of Euler conditions in
modeling aggregate demand (for instance, in
McCallum and Nelson, 1999) and, with other
New Keynesian pioneers, the use of a condition
such as (3) to derive the New Keynesian aggregate-
demand relation.
Do McCallum and Nelson really believe that
a modern central bank is less rational and goal-
directed and a worse optimizer than the average
consumer? At least they must admit that policy-
makers in modern central banks have the advan-
tage above the average consumer of being advised
by a staff with an increasing number of Ph.D.
economists with training in modern macroeco-
nomics and intertemporal optimization. Indeed,
an increasing proportion of policymakers them-
selves are Ph.D. economists with such training!
A structural description of consumption
choice is essential in estimating meaningful and
robust empirical representations of consumption
behavior. In the same way, a structural description
of monetary policy is essential in estimating mean-
ingful and robust representations of monetary
policy—for instance, parameters of a monetary
policy loss function. Furthermore, a structural
description of consumption choice is essential
in generating correct predictions in macro models
of the consequences of changes in the policy
regime. In the same way, a structural description
of monetary policy is essential in generating cor-
rect predictions in macro models of consequences
of changes in the monetary policy regime (in the
form of changes in parameters of the monetary
policy loss function), changes in the fiscal policy
regime, changes in the policy regime of other coun-
tries, or other changes in the relevant economic
or political environment.9
Indeed, microfoundations of policy are often
as helpful as microfoundations of private sector
behavior.
Svensson
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9 See Benigno and Benigno (2003) and Svensson (2004) for examples
of the use of targeting rules in discussing international monetary
cooperation and transmission of shocks.3 AN EXAMPLE OF AN OPTIMAL
TARGETING RULE
To present an example of a targeting rule, let
me consider a variant of the New Keynesian
model, a variant used in Svensson and Woodford
(2005) and Svensson (2003b), where inflation and
the output gap are predetermined.10 This variant
will also be used in discussing McCallum and
Nelson’s instrument rule analog in Section 4.
Private sector “plans” made in period t for
inflation and the output gap in period t +1, πt+1|t
and xt+1|t, are determined in period t by
(4)
(5) 
The aggregate-supply relation, (4), follows
from the first-order condition for Calvo-style profit-
maximizing price-setting firms. The firms are
assumed to index prices to the long-run average
inflation, E[πt], between the times of optimal price-
setting, which implies that the long-run Phillips
curve is vertical. The parameter δ (0 < δ < 1) is a
discount factor, and αx > 0 is the slope of the short-
run Phillips curve. The expression αzzt+1 is the
inner product of a vector of coefficients, αz, and
a vector of exogenous random variables, zt+1 (the
“deviation” in period t +1), such that αzzt+1 is a
simple representation of the difference between
this simple model and the true model of the trans-
mission mechanism. The deviation may also
include any “cost-push” and other shocks. Then,
zt+1|t ; Etzt+1, where Et denotes expectations
conditional on information available in period t,
is the private sector’s estimate of the deviation—
the private sector’s “judgment” in period t. Thus,
the one-period-ahead inflation plan depends on
expected future inflation, πt+2|t ; Etπt+2, the output
gap plan, xt+1|t, and the private sector judgment,
zt+1|t.
xx i r z tt tt r tt tttt z tt + ++ + +
∗
+ =− −− () + 12 12 1 1 βπ β .
ππ δ ππ αα tt t tt tx tt z t xz ++ + −     =−     () ++ 12 1 EE + +1 t,
The aggregate-demand relation, (5), follows
from the first-order condition for optimal con-
sumption choice by households. Here, it+1 is the
instrument rate set by the central bank in period
t +1, r*
t+1 is an exogenous Wicksellian natural
interest rate (the real interest rate in a hypothetical
flexible-price economy with zero deviation), and
βr is a positive constant (in the simplest case, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption). Thus, the one-period-ahead output
gap plan depends on the expected future output
gap, xt+2|t, the expected one-period-ahead real
interest-rate gap, it+1|t – πt+2|t – r*
t+1|t, and the pri-
vate sector judgment, zt+1|t (through the inner
product βzzt+1|t).
Actual inflation and the output gap in period
t +1 will then differ from the plans because of
unanticipated shocks to the deviation and natural
interest rate:
Suppose the central bank conducts flexible
inflation targeting and has an intertemporal loss
function in period t,
(6)
where the period loss is
(7)
where π* is the inflation target and λ > 0 is the
weight on output gap stabilization relative to
inflation stabilization.
An equilibrium that minimizes the central
bank’s intertemporal loss function (under commit-
ment in a timeless perspective) will fulfill the
first-order condition
(8)
for all periods t (Svensson and Woodford, 2005,
and Svensson, 2003b). This condition is the central
bank’s optimal targeting rule for private sector
inflation and output gap plans.
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10 A predetermined variable depends on the current period’s realiza-
tions of exogenous variables and previous periods’ realizations of
endogenous and exogenous variables. Equivalently, a predetermined
variable has exogenous one-period-ahead forecast errors (cf. Klein,
2000).choice by the private sector is described by the
first-order conditions (4) and (5), and optimal
monetary policy is characterized by the first-order
condition (8), the central bank’s targeting rule.
The behavior of the agents of the model—the firms,
the households, and the central bank—are each
described by a first-order condition, an attractive
symmetry. The central bank’s targeting rule is a
robust, compact, and, therefore, practical way to
describe the optimal monetary policy. In particu-
lar, it is robust to the central bank’s estimate of the
deviation—the central bank’s “judgment”—and
any additive shocks and their stochastic proper-
ties, in the sense that neither the judgment nor any
shocks enter into the targeting rule. The targeting
rule (8) is a structural representation of monetary
policy to the same extent that the aggregate-supply
and aggregate-demand relations are structural
representations of private sector behavior.
As discussed in some detail in Svensson
(2003b), the optimal targeting rule is simply, and
fundamentally, a restatement of the standard
efficiency condition of equality between the
marginal rates of substitution and transformation
between the target variables. The target variables—
the variables that enter into the loss function—
are inflation and the output gap. The marginal
rate of substitution between inflation and the
output gap follows from the form of the loss func-
tion, including the relative weight, λ. The marginal
rate of transformation between inflation and the
output gap follows from the form of the aggregate-
supply relation, including the slope of the short-
run Phillips curve, αx. Thus, these two parameters
appear in the targeting rule. Because the marginal
rate of transformation between inflation and the
output gap is completely determined by the
aggregate-supply relation, the aggregate-demand
relation and its parameters do not affect the target-
ing rule; the targeting rule is, in this case, robust
to the aggregate-demand relation.
Thus, fundamentally, the optimal targeting rule
is simply the very robust and intuitive relation
MRS = MRT,
where MRS and MRT refer, respectively, to the
marginal rates of substitution and transformation
between the target variables. This relation holds
regardless of the particulars of the model and is,
in this sense, model independent. Consider the
following instruction: “From your loss function,
find the marginal rate of substitution between your
target variables. From your view of the transmis-
sion mechanism of monetary policy, find your
marginal rate of transformation between the target
variables. Find and implement an instrument rate,
or instrument rate plan, that makes these marginal
rates of substitution and transformation equal.
Optimal monetary policy is, in principle, as easy
as that.” What more robust description of optimal
monetary policy can you find?
The optimal equilibrium can be solved for
by combining the targeting rule, (8), with the
aggregate-supply relation, (4). This results in a
second-order difference equation that can be
solved for the optimal inflation and output gap
plans. Substitution of these plans into the
aggregate-demand relation, (5), gives the corre-
sponding optimal instrument rate plan. Svensson
and Woodford (2005) and Svensson (2003b) dis-
cuss in some detail how the central bank can
implement (8) for private sector plans by “forecast
targeting”—constructing and announcing inflation
and output gap projections and a corresponding
instrument rate plan that “look good” in the sense
of fulfilling the analog of (8) for inflation and
output gap projections. McCallum and Nelson
do not go into those details.
4 VOLATILITY FROM 
INSTRUMENT RULES?
Instead, McCallum and Nelson provide a
more precise analysis of their previous claim (in
McCallum, 1999, p. 1493, and McCallum and
Nelson, 2000) that there is a useful instrument
rule analog of any targeting rule. They discuss
two alternatives: The central bank implements a
targeting rule, such as (8), directly; and the central
bank replaces the targeting rule (8) with an instru-
ment rule such as
(9)
ir x x t tt tt
x




+− −− = −+ − ()









FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 2005 619where µ is a large positive number. The idea with
(9) is that, for a large µ, there would be an equi-
librium fulfilling (4), (5), and (9), where the term
in the bracket on the right side of (9) is close to
zero and the instrument rate on the left side is
close to the optimal instrument rate. Therefore,
this instrument rule would result in an equilib-
rium close to the optimal equilibrium.
This is indeed the case, under some circum-
stances. But what is the point with McCallum and
Nelson’s instrument rule? First, for any finite µ, the
corresponding equilibrium is no longer optimal
but only close to optimal. Everything else equal,
optimal is better. Second, equation (9) is a more
complex equilibrium condition than (8). Every-
thing else equal, simplicity is better than complex-
ity. Third, the targeting rule (8) has the attractive
conceptual property of corresponding to a stan-
dard efficiency condition, the equality of the mar-
ginal rates of substitution and transformation
between the target variables. The instrument rule
(9) has no such intuitive interpretation. Hence,
there is a conceptual disadvantage to (9). Fourth,
it is no longer possible to solve for the optimal
inflation and output gap plans by combining (9)
only with the aggregate-supply relation, (4).
Because the instrument rate enters, (9) must now
be combined also with the aggregate-demand
relation, (5), leading to a higher-order system of
difference equations. Hence, there is a computa-
tional disadvantage to (9).11 Fifth, as discussed
in some detail in Svensson and Woodford (2005),
modifying targeting or instrument rules in this
way often affects the determinacy properties of
forward-looking models and is therefore not
innocuous.
Finally, as pointed out in Svensson and
Woodford (2005) and Svensson (2003b), a high
response coefficient, µ, can lead to instrument
rate volatility under realistic information assump-
tions of some central bank mistakes or even just
rounding errors. From a practical perspective, a
very high response coefficient is a bizarre idea
and would cause serious problems, except under
very strange circumstances, as we shall see.
Thus, for several reasons, the instrument
rule (9) is inferior to the targeting rule (8). I have
not found any arguments by McCallum and
Nelson in favor of (9). McCallum and Nelson
might have thought that (9) would be easier to
implement than (8). But a more precise discussion
of the implementation reveals that this is not so:
Aside from the issue of volatility, they are equally
difficult or easy to implement.12
To examine the case of central bank mistakes,
McCallum and Nelson consider the targeting rule
with a random error, et,
(10)     
and the alternative instrument rule,
(11) 
We can (in a simpler discussion of implemen-
tation than in footnote 12) interpret the instrument
rule as the central bank attempting to observe pri-
vate sector plans πt+1|t and xt+1|t in period t, using
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11 More precisely, (8) can be combined with only (4) to solve for the
optimal inflation and output gap plans. These can then be substi-
tuted into (5) to find the optimal instrument rate. If (9) is used
instead of (8), it has to be combined with both (4) and (5) to solve
for the optimal inflation and output gap plans.
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12 The instrument rule (9) is an implicit instrument rule, meaning
that it is an equilibrium condition, where the variables on the right
side depend on the instrument rate; there is a simultaneity aspect
that needs to be handled. In contrast, an explicit instrument rule
makes the instrument a function of predetermined variables, which
are hence independent of the instrument. Hence, the implementa-
tion of an explicit instrument rule is simply a matter of observing
the predetermined variables and calculating and announcing the
corresponding instrument value. Implicit instrument rules and
targeting rules are both equilibrium conditions, with variables that
are simultaneously determined. Hence, their implementation is
different from, and more complicated than, that of an explicit instru-
ment rule. As discussed in detail in Svensson and Woodford (2005)
and Svensson (2003b), their implementation requires the central
bank to use its model of the transmission mechanism, make pro-
jections of the variables included in the target rule or implicit
instrument rule, and find the combination of instrument and target-
variable projections that fulfill the target rule or implicit instru-
ment rule. Announcing these projections and implementing the
instrument rate path will then induce the private sector to behave
according to the desired equilibrium.(12)            
for use in (9). In doing this, the central bank
introduces a random error, et.
McCallum and Nelson then actually calculate
the rational expectations equilibrium under the
implicit assumption that the error, et, is immedi-
ately observed and known to both the central bank
and the private sector in period t, before the instru-
ment rate it+1is announced. Suppose that the error
is positive, et > 0. Everything else equal, it would
raise the instrument rate by µet > 0, where µ is a
large number. The private sector, realizing this,
immediately responds by lowering their inflation
and output gap plans, πt+1|t and xt+1|t, according
to (4) and (5). Indeed, the private sector is assumed
to instantaneously adjust their plans so as to bring
about the rational expectations equilibrium for a
known error, et. Furthermore, the central bank is
then assumed to observe the adjusted plans, and
then calculate and implement the equilibrium
instrument rate according to (11). The result is
that the equilibrium instrument rate increases by
much less than µet. Indeed, with a large µ, (10) is
approximately fulfilled, so the equilibrium result-
ing from (11) ends up being similar to the equi-
librium resulting from (10) (disregarding any
determinacy issues). In particular, the error intro-
duces no more volatility for the instrument rule
(11) than for the targeting rule (10).
But the idea that the central bank and the
private sector immediately observe the error in
period t is strange, to say the least. If the central
bank observes the error, why does it not immedi-
ately correct the sum (12) so as to eliminate the
error and instead implement (9) without any error?
Assume, more realistically, that the error is
not immediately observed by the central bank or
the private sector. Instead, the private sector first
forms its plans under the assumption of an
expected central bank error equal to zero (assum-
ing that the error is i.i.d. and has a zero mean).
The central bank then imperfectly observes those
plans, introduces the (measurement) error, and
announces the corresponding instrument rate, it+1,
for period t +1. Assume, realistically, that the
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each period. In this case, the error hits the instru-
ment rate with the full force of µet. If the private
sector knows its own plans and how the central
bank calculates the instrument rate, the private
sector will be able to infer the error when it learns
it+1. If the announcement is early—in period t
rather than in period t+1—the private sector may
be able to adjust its plans after the announcement,
and the error will have an impact on the plans. If
the announcement is late—in period t +1—the
private sector plans cannot be adjusted and the
plans for inflation and the output gap are unaf-
fected by the error. But, in either case, the error
still affects the instrument rate with the full magni-
tude µet. Under this realistic information assump-
tion of the error not being immediately observed
by the central bank and the private sector, a large µ
will indeed introduce high volatility of the instru-
ment rate, precisely as argued in Svensson and
Woodford (2005) and Svensson (2003b). Central
bankers, beware of McCallum and Nelson’s
instrument rule!
Even something as trivial as a small rounding
error could be problematic. Suppose that the
central bank rounds off its calculation of (12) to
one decimal percentage point—that is, 10 basis
points. This would introduce a uniformly distrib-
uted absolute error with a mean of 2.5 basis points.
With µ = 50, the corresponding mean absolute
error of the instrument rate is 125 basis points—
a sizeable error, especially because instrument
changes are seldom larger than 50 basis points.
In real-world monetary policy, the error, et, could
be substantially larger—say, a mean absolute
error of 50 basis points (0.5 percent) or more.
With µ = 50, this would lead to a huge mean
absolute instrument rate error of 2,500 basis points
or more.
McCallum and Nelson (2005) defend their
informational assumptions by pointing out, in
their reply (“Commentary,” pp. 627-31), that
Svensson and Woodford (2005) and Svensson
(2003b) make information assumptions that imply
that any error would be immediately revealed. But
Svensson and Woodford (2005) and Svensson
(2003b) do not attempt to provide any detailed
discussion of such central bank errors and related
realistic information assumptions. This detail is
Svensson
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that McCallum and Nelson would have considered
more realistic information assumptions on their
own, because these assumptions are so crucial to
their proposition. Indeed, realistic assumptions
completely contradict their proposition.
Thus, the criticism in Svensson and Woodford
(2005) and Svensson (2003b) of McCallum and
Nelson’s proposed instrument rule stands up to
scrutiny: An instrument rule such as (9) with a
very large response coefficient is a purely aca-
demic construction and completely impractical
for any real-world monetary policy. The first five
items in the list in the beginning of this section
provide additional reasons why such instrument
rules are inferior to targeting rules.
5 GENERAL TARGETING RULES?
The discussion here has so far concerned
“specific” targeting rules, in the terminology of
Svensson and Woodford (2005) and Svensson
(2003b). Those papers also define “general” target-
ing rules for monetary policy as an operational
formulation of the objectives for monetary policy—
for instance, in the form of listing the target vari-
ables and the corresponding target levels and
specifying the loss function to be minimized.
McCallum and Nelson clearly find this definition
confusing and not useful. My idea behind the
definition is that the instruction to “specify your
loss function in an operational way, construct fore-
casts of the target variables, and select and imple-
ment an instrument rate or an instrument rate path
such that the forecasts minimize the loss function”
is such a specific instruction to a central bank that
it deserves to be called a “rule,” in the common
(and dictionary, see Merriam-Webster, 1996) sense
of a rule being “a prescribed guide for conduct or
action.”13 Perhaps it would have been better, and
caused less confusion, to refer to this as “general
targeting” instead of a “general targeting rule.”14
Walsh (2003) uses the term “targeting regime,”
which arguably is better.15
The idea with a particular terminology and
particular definitions is, of course, that it shall
contribute to more useful and precise discussion
and analysis. I am inclined to concede that the
term “general targeting rule” has not been success-
ful and that Walsh’s term “targeting regime” is
better. Consequently, I am inclined to use that
terminology in the future and to let “targeting
rules” refer only to what I have previously called
“specific” targeting rules.16
6 CONCLUSION
Counter to what McCallum and Nelson seem
to take as granted, there is no reason at all to limit
a study of robust simple monetary policy rules
to instrument rules; simple targeting rules may
have more desirable properties. Furthermore,
targeting rules are a compact, robust, structural
and, therefore, practical representation of goal-
directed monetary policy. From a descriptive
13 This is the idea behind the word “rule” in the title of Svensson
(1999), “Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule.”
14 It should not be necessary to state that “targeting,” in the sense of
“achieving a target,” is best seen as equivalent to minimizing a
loss function that is increasing in the deviation between the target 
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variables and the target levels. That is, targeting and target variables
refer to a loss function to be minimized and the arguments in that
loss function. Previously, the literature has, by “targeting variable
X,” sometimes meant putting variable X in the instrument rule. To
avoid confusion, it is better to call this “responding to variable X.”
Generally, the best way to target variable X, in the sense of minimiz-
ing a loss function increasing in deviations of variable X from its
target level, is to respond, in the explicit instrument rule, to all the
determinants of variable X. Even if inflation and the output gap are
the only target variables, there are usually many more variables
determining future inflation and the output gap, and it is optimal
to respond to all of those. Generally, the mapping from a loss func-
tion to the optimal reaction function, the optimal explicit instru-
ment rule, is quite complex, and the response coefficients of the
optimal explicit instrument rule are complicated and sometimes
nonmonotonic functions of the parameters of the loss function and
the whole model. The size of the response coefficient of a variable
is not an indicator of the weight of the variable in the loss function.
15 In any case, there is always a close relation between a (specific)
targeting rule in the form of some scalar expression Tt(πt,xt) = 0
and a loss function of the form Lt = [Tt(πt,xt)]2, because the former
is a first-order condition for a minimum of the latter.
16 For a situation when a commitment to an optimal (specific) targeting
rule is not possible, Svensson and Woodford (2005) and Svensson
(2003b) discuss a “commitment to continuity and predictability,”
which involves minimizing the central-bank loss function while
taking into account the cost of deviating from previously announced
forecasts. This will make optimization under discretion result in
the optimal outcome under commitment. Strangely, McCallum and
Nelson describe this mechanism that induces the central bank to
keep previous promises as “the central bank describing its objectives
dishonestly to the public” (p. 598).point of view, they amount to the same develop-
ment in the theory of monetary policy as the
consumption Euler conditions in the theory of
consumption. Optimal targeting rules express the
intuitive optimality condition of equality between
the marginal rates of substitution and transforma-
tion of the target variables. They provide micro-
founded monetary policy, in the same way Euler
conditions provide microfounded private sector
behavior. Regardless of McCallum and Nelson’s
skepticism in McCallum and Nelson (2005), tar-
geting rules for the analysis of monetary policy
have arrived and are, as indicated by the long list
of papers and books mentioned in the introduc-
tion, likely to stay. In particular, McCallum and
Nelson’s proposed instrument rule analog to any
targeting rule will, under realistic information
assumptions, lead to very high instrument rate
volatility; for other reasons, it is also inferior to
the targeting rule.
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